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technical rules of criminal pro-
cedure were to be introduced to 
the juvenile court system, the 
purpose behind the creation of 
Wadlow v. State: 
PROSECUTION 
IS REQUIRED TO 








the juvenile court system in pro-
viding a simplified, informal set-
ting in which to better effectu-
ate the rehabilitation and treat-
In Wadlow v. State, 335 
Md. 122, 642 A.2d 213 (1994), 
the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land formally classified enhanced 
sentencing requirements as ele-
ments of offenses which must 
be alleged and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt by the prose-
cution. The State cannot rely on 
the discretion of the trial court 
to conclude that the aggravat-
ing factors or quantity neces-
sary to elevate a particular of-
fense have been resolved. Fol-
lowing Wadlow v. State, such a 
conclusion may not be reached 
by the sentencingjudge, but must 
be determined by the trier of 
fact. 
Lauren Marie Wadlow 
was indicted by a Montgomery 
County Grand Jury for unlawful 
possession with intent to dis-
tribute (Count I), simple pos-
session (Count II), and conspir-
acyto distribute cocaine (Count 
III). The charging documents 
alleged possession of a certain 
ment of juveniles would be cir-
cumvented and thwarted. 
- Timothy Sean Daugherty 
quantity of cocaine sufficient to 
subject Wadlow to an enhanced 
statutory penalty for the pos-
session with intent to distribute 
charge. At trial in the Circuit 
Court for Montgomery Coun-
ty, however, the jury had not 
been instructed to determine the 
exact quantity of cocaine that 
the Defendant had possessed 
for enhancement purposes. 
Nevertheless, the jury found 
Wadlow guilty of all three 
counts. At sentencing, the sim-
ple possession count was 
merged into possession with in-
tent to distribute. Wadlow was 
then given a four year sentence 
for possession with intent to 
distribute and a consecutive one-
year sentence for the conspiracy 
charge. 
At the conclusion ofthe 
jury trial, the State filed a mo-
tion seeking to correct an illegal 
sentence, arguing that the quan-
tity of cocaine seized mandated 
imposition of a five year, no 
parole sentence, and that the 
conspiracy, rather than the sim-
ple possession charge, should 
merge into the possession with 
intent to distribute conviction. 
The trial judge, with little expla-
nation, merged the conspiracy 
charge and imposed a five year 
sentence for possession with 
intent to distribute. The trial 
judge, however, refused to state 
for the record that the revised 
sentence had been imposed in 
accordance with the increased 
penalty provision found within 
the possession statute. The State 
appealed, insisting that the trial 
judge had not followed the stat-
utory enhancement requirement. 
Wadlow cross-appealed, argu-
ing that an increased sentence 
could only result following a 
jury finding of the statutorily 
required quantity of cocaine. 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland held that the exist-
ence offactors requiring impo-
sition of an increased sentence 
must be determined by the trial 
judge, not the jury, and that the 
trial judge in this case had im-
plicitly made such a finding in 
resentencing Wadlow. Accord-
ingly, the court of special ap-
peals affirmed Defendant's con-
viction, but remanded the case 
with instructions for the trial 
judge to explicitly state that the 
resulting sentence had been giv-
en based on mandatory enhance-
ment guidelines. Wadlow peti-
tioned the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland for a writ of certiora-
ri. The court granted the peti-
tion in order to clarity the re-
spective duties of judge and 
jury regarding mandatory en-
hanced sentencing provisions. 
The court of· appeals 
first examined the offenses 
charged and the corresponding 
Maryland Code references. 
Wadlow, 335 Md. at 126, 642 
A.2d at 214. Possession with 
the intent to distribute (Count I) 
was made unlawful by Article 
27, Section 286. Id Section 
286(a)(1) specifically prohibit-
ed the possession of a "con-
trolled dangerous substance in 
sufficient quantity to reasonably 
indicate . . . an intent to . . . 
dispense." Id. In addition, 
Section 286(f) provided for en-
hanced sanctions for violations 
of Section 286(a)(1) involving 
possession of larger quantities 
of the controlled dangerous sub-
stance.Id. Wadlowwascharged 
with unlawfully possessing a 
quantity of cocaine that permit-
ted the inference of an intent to 
distribute under Section 
286(a)(I). Id. at 126, 642 A.2d 
at 215. Although the quantity 
of cocaine allegedly in Wadlow's 
possession would have quali-
fied for an increased sentence 
under § 286(f), the jury had not 
been charged with deciding 
whether the amount possessed 
satisfied the sentencing enhance-
ment provision. Id. The simple 
possession, and conspiracy con-
victions, Counts II and III re-
spectively, were given only brief 
consideration by the court of 
appeals. Id. at 127, 642 A.2d at 
215. 
The court primarily fo-
cused on the initial and subse-
quent sentences imposed as a 
result of the Count I conviction. 
Id. at 128,642A.2dat216. The 
State argued that the United 
States Constitution and federal 
courts of appeals both permit-
ted imposition of an enhanced 
penalty based on factual deter-
minations made by a sentencing 
judge. Id. The court agreed, 
but noted that in Maryland such 
factual determinations were per-
missible only in situations where 
a defendant's prior conduct was 
in question. Id. at 129, 642 
A.2d at 216. In the instant case, 
the increased sentence depend-
ed not on the applicability of 
Wadlow's previous convictions, 
but upon a possessory offense 
with multiple degrees. Id. at 
132, 642 A.2d at 218. The 
court noted that where the leg-
islature had provided different 
sentences for the same offense, 
based on a particular variable, 
that variable must be treated as 
an element ofthe offense. Id. In 
the absence of contrary legisla-
tiveintent, the prosecution must 
allege and prove such circum-
stances beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. 
The court provided a 
useful analogy using the offense 
of malicious destruction of prop-
erty. Id. at 130, 642 A.2d at 
216. Much like the multiple-
punishment scheme of Section 
286, the prohibition against de-
struction of property had also 
been separated into varied pen-
alties. Id. While similarly clas-
sified as a single offense, the 
value of property destroyed 
could serve to elevate the par-
ticular sanction dispensed. Id. 
at 131, 642 A.2d at 217. Ap-
propriately, the court held that 
the property value should be 
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deemed an element of the of-
fense that the prosecution must 
allege and prove. Id. at 132, 
642 A.2d .at 217 (citing with 
approval Hagans v. State, 316 
Md. 429, 559 A.2d 792 (1989)). 
Since Section 286 also provid-
ed for varied punishments based 
upon the quantity of a controlled 
dangerous substance possessed, 
the specific quantity is such an 
element that the State must al-
lege and prove. Id. 
In this case, the State 
had not charged Wadlow with a 
possessory violation of Section 
286(t), only of Section 
286(a)(I). Id. at 126, 642 A.2d 
at 215. Moreover, contrary to 
the accepted judicial treatment 
of other multi-faceted offenses, 
the jury had not been properly 
instructed to make a factual find-
ing regarding the quantity of 
cocaine in Wadlow's posses-
sion. Id. at 127, 642 A.2d at 
215. Since the sentencing judge 
had made such a determination, 
the court of appeals held that 
the prosecution had neither met 
the allegation nor the burden of 
proof Id. at 134, 642 A.2d at 
218. Wadlow's revised sen-
tencewas therefore vacated and 
replaced with the trial judge's 
original imposition of a four year 
term of imprisonment. Id. 
In Wadlow v. State, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
explicitly held that the quantity 
of controlled dangerous sub-
stance necessary to activate 
Section 286(f)'s enhanced pen-
alty provision was to be treated 
as an element of the possessory 
offense that must be alleged and 
proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt by the prosecution. The 
State, in meeting its burden of 
proof, must persuade the trier 
of fact, not the sentencingjudge 
of the actual quantity possessed. 
This holding prohibits the State 
from vaguely charging poten-
tial defendants, then seeking 
severe, unexpected, mandatory 
penalties during the sentencing 
phase of trial. The holding also 
sets forth the requirement that 
the prosecution accurately put 
defendants on notice as to the 
maximum sanctions that they 
may be subjected to upon con-
viction. The court, by placing 
such burdens on the prosecu-
tion, implicitly safeguarded in-
dividual rights and restrained 
future oppressive State conduct. 
- Christopher R. Rahl 
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